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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ryan Thomas Davidson appeals pro se from the district court's
intermediate appellate decision affirming the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state adopts the following statement of facts set forth by the district
court in its "Memorandum Decision On Appeal" 1 :
On November 29, 2007, during the suspension period
imposed in Mag Ct Case No. T0724995.01, Davidson was cited for
Driving Without Privileges, CR-MD-2007-16222, the case that is
currently on appeal.
On October 28, 2008, Davidson failed to attend a pretrial
conference and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
After the pretrial conference, the Prosecutor's office offered to
reduce the charge from a DWP to an Invalid Ucense and agreed to
stipulate to quash the bench warrant and not file additional charges
for the failure to appear, if Davidson agreed to a $150 fine, and
court costs of $75.50. Davidson rejected this offer against the
advice of his counsel. Based on Davidson's request, the court
ordered the Public Defender's office [sic] appoint conflict counsel.
Davidson asked his conflict counsel to move the trial court to
dismiss the case based on similar arguments that he has made in
this appeal. Conflict counsel refused to file a motion to dismiss the
case and Davidson opted to proceed pro se. Davidson then filed
his own motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion on
May 14, 2009.
After that decision, Davidson entered a conditional guilty
plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
dismiss under Rule 11. At a sentencing hearing held on June 16,
2009, Davidson conditionally pied guilty. The court sentenced him
to three (3) days jail and suspended his driver's license for six (6)
months. Rather than staying the sentence as Davidson requested,
the court immediately remanded Davidson into custody to serve his
jail sentence. The sentence was not stayed because Davidson had
1

A copy of the district court's opinion is attached as Appendix A.
1

failed to file a written motion requesting that the sentence be
stayed.
Davidson, while incarcerated, filed a proposed order for
immediate stay of execution. The order was not signed for two
weeks, and as a result, Davidson served his entire jail sentence.
(R., pp.142-143.)

Davidson filed a prose appeal of the magistrate's denial of his motion to
dismiss asserting he did not receive proper due process in relation to his license
suspension, the Idaho Code did not mandate a license suspension for someone
in his circumstances, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
magistrate judge abused its discretion by immediately remanding him to jail to
serve his sentence. (R., pp.61-62; 73-105.) After reviewing the record and the
applicable law, the district court disagreed and affirmed Davidson's conviction,
finding that Davidson "fail(edJ to establish reversible error in any of the five issues
he state(dJ on appeal." (R., pp.139-151.) Davidson timely appealed the district
court's appellate decision. (R., pp.152-156.)

2

ISSUES

Davidson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Davidson's drivers' [sic] license was suspended without
procedural due process. Although some procedural due
process is available, it is not enough to satisfy the 14th
Amendment.

2.

The suspension of Davidson's license was illegal under
Idaho Code. That a suspension was illegal should be a valid
defense to the charge of DWP, and should not be
considered waived by failure to address it prior to the
criminal charge.

3.

The law which authorized a suspension of Davidson's
license is unreasonable and an unnecessary infringement of
the right to travel on the public highway, and constitutes a
violation of substantive due process.

4.

Davidson's counsel was so ineffective it should be deemed
to be no counsel, which violates his rights under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

5.

Davidson's immediate remand to jail after sentencing by the
Magistrate Judge constituted an abuse of discretion.

6.

Davidson is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the
Private Attorney General Doctrine (which should be
extended to apply to criminal cases), and prior rulings
holding that pro se litigants are held to the same standards
as attorneys. As such, they should be compensated like
attorneys pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-860 (b).

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Davidson failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate's order denying his motion to dismiss?
2.
Has Davidson failed to establish that he is entitled to an award of attorney
fees on appeal?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Davidson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Affirming The
Denial Of His Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Davidson challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing as he did

below that the driver's license suspension underlying his charge of DWP was
illegal as well as a violation of his due process rights and his counsel's level of
incompetence constituted a violation of his right to counsel. (Appellant's brief,
pp.3-33.)

Davidson also argues the magistrate court abused its discretion by

immediately remanding him to serve his jail sentence because he had not fried a
motion to stay execution of the sentence.

(Appellant's brief, pp.34-38.)

Davidson's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded it had no
jurisdiction to entertain Davidson's collateral attack on his license suspension,
the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by immediately remanding
Davidson into custody to serve his sentence and Davidson failed to establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.143-150.)

8.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is

4

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981 )).

C.

The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate Court's Order
Denying Davidson's Motion To Dismiss
The district court, in a well-researched and reasoned opinion, affirmed

Davidson's misdemeanor DWP conviction, ruling that Davidson failed to
"establish reversible error in any of the five issues he state[d] on appeal." (R.,
pp.139-151 (attached as Appendix A).) The state adopts the district court's
written opinion as its argument on appeal.

11.
Davidson Has Failed To Establish That He Is Entitled To Attorney Fees On
Appeal
Davidson asserts that he is entitled to "be compensated by the State for
the time spent preparing his defense" as a pro se litigant in a system where
"many courts seem to take no great shame in bludgeoning pro se defendants
with the policy that they are to be held to the same standards as attorneys, and
are not excused from adhering to the myriad of procedural rules." (Appellant's
brief, p.39.)

Davidson claims he is entitled to "fees and reasonable expenses

pursuant to I.C. § 19-860." (Id.) He also asserts that if he is successful on any of

5

his constitutional claims on appeal, he is entitled to an award of attorney fees
pursuant to the Private Attorney General Doctrine. (Id.) Davidson is incorrect.
Idaho Code§ 19-860 relates to public defender compensation and is inapplicable
in this situation. Additionally, Davidson's reliance on the "Private Attorney
General Doctrine" for support of his demand for attorney fees in this case is also
misplaced. Davidson correctly notes that the two cases he cites to as authority
make it clear that the "doctrine was created for use in civil cases." (Appellant's
brief, p.39.)

Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977), and Hellar v.

Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984), involved civil litigation
concerning the issues of an ineffective public school financing system and
legislative reapportionment, respectively.
Davidson claims "there is no rational reason why [the doctrine] shouldn't
be extended to criminal cases if a prevailing defendant can meet the same threeprong criteria," necessary to support such an award.

(Appellant's brief, p.39.)

Davidson, however, cites to no case in which the doctrine has been applied to a
criminal case. Moreover, a review of the "three-prong criteria" reveals that such
an application would be unwarranted.

The three criteria are of the Private

Attorney General Doctrine are "[t]he strength or societal importance of the public
policy indicated by the litigation," "[t]he necessity for private enforcement and the
magnitude of the resultant burden on the Plaintiff," and "[t]he number of people
standing to benefit from the decision." 106 Idaho 571, 577-78, 682 P.2d 524,
530-31. Davidson's only argument is because it was in the "public's interest" to
turn down a plea bargain which would have resulted in a sentence consisting of

6

"a small fine with no jail time -- in order to spend countless hours at a cost of
thousands of dollars in lost opportunity," to appeal the magistrate's decision, he
is entitled to attorney fees under this doctrine.

(Appellant's brief, p.39.)

Davidson has not shown that he can satisfy one of these criteria, much less all
three. Davidson's request for attorney fees should be denied.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the magistrate court's
denial of Davidson's motion to dismiss.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of September 2011, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing a
copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

RYANT. DAVIDSON
121 East 36th Street
Garden City, ID 83714
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APPENDIX A

NO. _ _ __
FILED

A.M _ _ _~.M.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CR-MD-2007-16222

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL

VS.

RY AN THOMAS DAVIDSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

This matter is before the Court as an Appeal from the trial court's Memorandum
Decision on Davidson's Motion to Dismiss entered May 20, 2009, denying Davidson's
motion to dismiss. Davidson filed this appeal pro se. 1
The Court heard oral argument on August 19, 2010, and took the matter under
advisement. Subsequent to the hearing, pursuant to I.R.E. 201, the Court gave notice of its
intent to take judicial notice of the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, in the appeal file in Appeal
Case No. H0800230 and the underlying case, Mag Ct Case No. T0724995.01. Neither party
responded.
./

Fnr the re2}~nns set f'1rth h~1rn.~,, th~ r0.nrt ~ffi'!:nc;: thP. t:i~t !"'.:Ynrt's ~F'"Y"ia1 of the :r-~. 1oticn1

to Dismiss and remands for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

1

Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because they are representing themselves and
are not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375,383 (2007);
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392,
797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385,388 n.5
(1987).

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222

1

001.39

? ;.;-r·
k'.?
~

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Mag Ct Case No. T0724995.01 and appellate Case No. H0800230.

fu June of 2007, in an unrelated case,2 Case No. T0724995.01, Ryan Thomas
Davidson was charged with Driving on an Expired License under Idaho Code§ 49-319 and
Fictitious Display of Plates under Idaho Code§ 49-456. After a court trial on July 23, 2007,
the trial court found him guilty of the expired license charge, and Davidson, thereafter pied
guilty to the fictitious display charge. The trial court sentenced Davidson to the statutory
penalties on each count.
Three days later, Davidson filed a Motion For Discharge Of Judgment and on August
2, 2007, the trial court denied the motion. Pursuant to Idaho fufraction Rule 10, the trial court
gave notice that Davidson had failed to pay his fines and in response, on August 27, 2007,
Davidson filed an affidavit of indigency, seeking relief from payment of fines on those
grounds. The trial court held a hearing on Davidson's motion. After the hearing, the trial
court held that Davidson was not indigent, and, therefore, denied the motion for relief On
August 28, 2007, the Department of Transportation issued a notice to Davidson that his
license would be suspended from September 17, 2007 through December 16, 2007, for failure
to pay his fines in T0724995.01. Davidson admitted receiving a copy of that notice in his
earlier appeal, Case No. H0800230, that this Court judicially noticed.
On December 10, 2007, pursuant to Idaho fufraction Rule 11, Davidson filed a Motion
to Show Cause as to whether his license should be suspended for the original tickets, and
contemporaneously filed a motion to stay the suspension of his driving privileges. The trial
court denied the motion.
Davidson appealed the decision on February 15, 2008, and asked the appellate court
on appeal to waive fees and costs on the grounds he was indigent. LC. § 31-3220.

In an

2

The only relation this case has to the present appeal is that as a result of Davidson's failure to pay his fines in
this case, the Department of Transportation suspended his license pursuant to LC. § 49-1505 and during that
suspension Davidson received the Driving Without Privileges charge in the case that is now on appeal before this
Court.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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exercise of discretion, the appellate court denied his request, finding that his appeal is clearly
frivolous and gave notice of its intent to dismiss on March 31, 2008. LC.§ 31-3220 (l)(c)
and (4). 3 More specifically, the appellate court held as follows:
While Davidson claims to be appealing from an order denying his
motion for an Order to Show Cause, in actuality he is challenging the Idaho
Transportation Department's Notice of Suspension issued August 28, 2007,
suspending his license pursuant to LC. § 49-1505 for his failure to pay fines
and fees in the traffic citation case, T0724995.0l. The time for challenging
that order has run.
Davidson admits receiving notice from the Department but he never availed
himself of the judicial review provided in LC. § 49-1505(6) which reads as
follows:
(6) Any person whose driver's license has been suspended under
this section may appeal to the district court in the county where the
infraction judgment was entered within the time and in the manner
provided for criminal appeals from the magistrates division to the
district court. The appeal shall be expedited as provided by rule of the
supreme court.
If the district court finds that the notice of
nonpayment of the infraction penalty should not have been sent to the
department for suspension of the driver's license, privileges or permit,
the district court shall order the privileges be reinstated by the
department and upon receipt of a copy of such order the department
shall reinstate the privileges without the payment of a fee.
Therefore, any challenge to the decision to suspend his license for his
failure to pay fees had to be filed in the District Court within 42 days of the
Notice. As the Honorable Judge Hawley noted in his Memorandum Decision
and Order dated March 19, 2008, Davidson did not appeal or seek judicial
review of the Department's Order. Therefore, the Court is without jurisdiction
to hear any challenge to that August 27, 2007, Order and this appeal which
attempts to circumvent the process is :frivolous.
Likewise, in T0724995.0l, Davidson did not appeal the order entered
on July 23, 2007, requiring him to pay fines and costs totaling $130.50 for
3

LC. § 31-3220( l) For purposes of this section, th~ following definitions shall apply:
(c) "Frivolous" means a claim which has no arguable basis in law or fact, ....

***
(4) No fees, costs or security shall be waived at the commencement of an action if the court finds and
certifies in writing that the action is frivolous, malicious or otherwise not taken in g_ood faith.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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driving with an expired license in violation of LC. § 49-319 and for violating
LC. § 49-456(2). Furthermore, he failed to appeal Judge Schmidt's September
11, 2007 decision refusing to discharge Davidson from paying the fines and
fees in the underlying infraction. Instead he chose to try to circumvent the
statutory procedure provided in LC. § 49-1505(6) by filing a Motion for an
Order to Show Cause in the underlying infraction case as to why his license
should not be reinstated.
As Judge Hawley found, this appeal is frivolous as having no arguable
basis in law or fact. Therefore, the Court denies his request to waive the
appellate transcript fees pursuant to LC.§ 31-3220(4).
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, appeal file in Case No. H0800230/Mag Ct Case No.
T0724995.0L
Davidson did not respond to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss and the appeal was
dismissed on April 28, 2008. Davidson did not appeal the dismissal. The time for appeal
would have run on June 10, 2008. Remittitur was entered on June 17, 2008. Thus, that case
was final before this appeal was filed.
The prior conviction and the resulting suspension of his license for failing to pay fines
associated with that conviction became the basis for the present charge from which he
appeals, CR-MD-2007-0016222, Driving Without Privileges, because he was driving during
the suspension imposed for his failure to pay his fines in Mag Ct Case No. T0724995.
B.

CR-MD-2007-16222

On November 29, 2007, during the suspension period imposed in Mag Ct Case No.
T0724995.0l, Davidson wa5 cited for Driving Without Privileges, CR-MD-2007-16222,
case that is currently on appeal.
On October 28, 2008, Davidson failed to attend a pretrial conference and the court
issued a bench warrant for his arrest. After the pretrial conference, the Prosecutor's Office
offered to reduce the charge from a DWP to an Invalid License and agreed to stipulate to
quash the bench warrant and not file additional charges for the failure to appear, if Davidson
agreed to a $150 fine, and court costs of $75.50. Davidson rejected this offer against the
advice of his counsel. Based on Davidson's request, the court ordered the Public Defender's
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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office appoint conflict counsel. Davidson asked his conflict counsel to move the trial court to
dismiss the case based on similar arguments that he has made in this appeal. Conflict counsel
refused to file a motion to dismiss the case and Davidson opted to proceed pro se. Davidson
then filed his own motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion on May 14, 2009.
After that decision, Davidson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss under Rule 11. At a sentencing hearing held on
June 16, 2009, Davidson conditionally pied guilty. The court sentenced him to three (3) days
jail and suspended his driver's license for six (6) months. Rather than staying the sentence as
Davidson requested, the court immediately remanded Davidson into custody to serve his jail
sentence. The sentence was not stayed because Davidson failed to file a written motion
requesting that the sentence be stayed.
Davidson, while incarcerated, filed a proposed order for immediate stay of execution;
the order was not signed for two weeks, and as a result, Davidson served his entire jail
sentence.
On July 14, 2009, Davidson appealed from the trial court's denial of his Motion to
Dismiss.
ANALYSIS

This appeal is being heard as an appellate proceeding. I.R.C.P. 83(b). A trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent, although conflicting,
evidence will not be set aside on appeal, unless they are clearly erroneous.

However,

appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding the application of a statute or its exercise
of jurisdiction is reviewed de nova because it involves purely a question of law. State v.
Davis, 135 Idaho 747, 24 P.3d 64, 65 (2001); State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930, 877 P.2d
898, 901 (1994).

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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;

A.

)

The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Davidson's collateral attack on
the suspension.

The majority of Davidson's appeal derives from the underlying suspension of his
license issued on August 28, 2007, by the Idaho Transportation Department, which suspended
his license from September 17, 2007, through December 16, 2007, pursuant to J.C. § 49-1505,
for his failure to pay fines and fees in the traffic citation case, T0724995.01. The Court has no
jurisdiction to consider his collateral attack on that suspension.
Specifically, Davidson maintains that his suspension resulting from his 2007 ticket
violated both procedural and substantive due process and was illegal under Idaho law. The
law is clear; once that suspension becomes final, he cannot challenge it. In his appeal, Case
No. H0800230, Davidson admitted that he had received the notice from the Department of
Transportation issued on August 28, 2007, but failed to avail himself of the judicial review
process provided in LC. § 49-1505(6) which reads as follows:
(6) Any person whose driver's license has been suspended under this
section may appeal to the district court in the county where the infraction
judgment was entered within the time and in the manner provided for criminal
appeals J,-om the magistrates division to the district court. 4 The appeal shall
be expedited as provided by rule of the supreme court. If the district court
finds that the notice of nonpayment of the infraction penalty should not have
been sent to the department for suspension of the driver's license, privileges or
permit, the district court shall order the privileges be reinstated by the
department and upon receipt of a copy of such order the department shall
reinstate the privileges without the payment of a fee.
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, any challenge tu the decision to suspend his iicense for his
failure to pay fees had to be filed in the District Court within forty-two (42) days of the Notice
dated August 28, 2007. Thus, Davidson had to file an appeal with the District Court by
October 10, 2007. Davidson did not appeal or seek judicial review of the Department's Order
with the District Court within forty-two (42) days of the Notice (October 10, 2007) as required

4

Any appeal must be filed "within forty-two (42) days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk
of court on the judgment, order or decree filed." I.C.R. 54.3.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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)

by the statute. Davidson only appealed the underlying ticket on February 15, 2008, well after
the time for appeal of the Department's suspension had expired.
Therefore, the appellate court in Case No. H0800230 found his appeal frivolous and
dismissed his appeal on April 28, 2008. The Court entered its Remittitur on June 17, 2008.
Therefore, to the extent he is complaining about the procedure used in suspending his license
in an earlier case, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider those claims. He
did not appeal the appellate decision dismissing his appeal in the earlier case and the time has
run. He failed to exhaust his remedies afforded him under the statute, LC. § 49-1505.
"The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional."

Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201,

Harrison v. Certain

233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010) (quoting In re

Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 755, 171 P.3d 242, 246 (2007). Furthermore, "[t]his
Court must address a question as to its jurisdiction even if not raised by the parties." Watson

v. Weick 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, this
Court has no jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the license suspension in Mag Ct Case
No. T0724995.01 and affirms the trial court. 5

B.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by immediately remanding
Davidson to jail after sentencing.

Davidson claims that the trial court abused its discretion in immediately remanding
him to custody after sentencing. Davidson, representing himself, entered his plea orally and
orally attempted to make it a conditional plea. 6 Davidson complains that the trial court abused
its discretion in irnmediaidy remandmg him to serve his sentence. However, I.M.C.R. 6(b)
clearly gives the trial court the discretion to immediately impose sentence.
5

The Court notes that while the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution applies to the deprivation
of a driver's license by the State, "[i]n a license suspension, the risk of an erroneous deprivation absent a prior
hearing is not great and additional procedures would not significantly reduce the nwnber of erroneous
deprivations." Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977). Therefore, there is no constitutional requirement that
he be afforded a pre-decisional hearing before his license is suspended. Moreover, the notice from the
Department was nearly two weeks before the suspension went into effect and Davidson could have availed
himself of the statutory process and did not. Therefore, even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider his claims,
they are not well taken.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6(b) provides in relevant part as follows:

(b) Plea Before the Court. . . . If the defendant enters a plea of guilty, the
court may thereupon impose the sentence or may appoint a later time for
imposing sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
When a trial court's exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
must determine (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 133 l,
1333 (1989); Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets,

Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.

App. 1987).
In this case, the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent) y

with the legal standards.

In imposing sentence and remanding Davidson, the trial com1

reached its decision by an exercise ofreason by stating as follows:
COURT: . . . All right. What I'm going to do is the following: Given
the financial concerns that I have here, I'm not certain that a fine would get
paid of£ What I'm going to do is waive the fines and costs. I'm going to
impose a five-day jail sentence, give credit for the two, leaving a balance of
three days and a statutory license suspension. . ..
In regard to those three days, I'm going to have you begin serving that
today. If you do happen to get the notification or appropriate paperwork filed
with the Court, Twill certainly entertain t.l-iat upon its receipt.
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, would it be possible to start serving that
tomorrow so I can have a day to get that motion in to request a stay of
execution pending the appeal in this case?
COURT: Well, as I indicated, that's something that has to be done prior
to the event. So you can still file that tomorrow, but I'm going to have the
marshals take you in today on this....

***
6

I.C.R. 11 requires a conditional plea to be made in writing.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL
CASE NO. CR-MD-2007-16222
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THE COL'iRT: Well, all I can tell you is that there are certain requirements
under Rule 11 and I'm simply following the letter of the law here that requires
that, where it is I understand the practical effect in your case, but that's the
way that the -- the manner in which the rule is written up and I think I'm
bound to follow it.
So if you wish to I'm not changing my mind on the jail sentence, but I
will certainly entertain any motion you do file upon its receipt.
The trial court appropriately weighed the factors, waived any fines and required him to serve
his sentence forthwith.
To the extent the misdemeanor rules do not cover a process, the Criminal Rules apply.
I.M.R. l. Therefore, the acceptance of a conditional plea is governed by I.C.R. 11 which
requires any conditional plea to be in writing. It is undisputed that Davidson entered his plea
orally. In addition, once a defendant enters a plea of guilty, even though he appeals the
decision, the decision to allow him to be released pending that appeal is also a matter of
discretion for the trial court.

Idaho Criminal Rule 46(a)(2) provides in relevant part as

follows:

a) Bail or release in non-capital cases. A defendant who is charged with a
crime that is not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail or released on
the defendant's own recognizance at any time before a guilty plea or verdict of
guilt. In the discretion of the court, bail or release on the defendant's own
recognizance may be allowed in the following cases:

***
(2) While an appeal is pending from a judgment of conviction, an order
withholding judgment, or an order imposing sentence, except that a court shall
not allow bail when the defendant has been sentenced to death or life
imprisonment.
I.C.R. 46 (emphasis added). In other words, like the decision to impose sentence, the decision
as to whether to allow Davidson to remain on bond pending appeal is a matter of discretion.
The Court finds that Davidson has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion and the
Court affirms the trial court.
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C.

Neither of Davidson's trial counsel was ineffective.

Davidson alleges that both of his counsel were ineffective because they refused to file
a motion to dismiss. The Court addresses claims for ineffective assistance of counsel utilizing
the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Payne v. State,
146 Idaho 548, _, 199 P.2d 123, 136 (2008); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277, 971 P.2d
727, 730 (1998).

To prevail on such a claim, the party must demonstrate (1) counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687-88; Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. When evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the Court does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions,
and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P .3d 831, 834
(2000). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range
of professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185
(1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d
1174, 1176 (1988)).
In other words, it is not enough for Davidson to simply show that his trial counsel's

errors had some conceivable effect on his case because virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. "[R]easonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. And as the United States
Supreme Court continued in Strickland: "In making this determination [referring to the
prejudice prong], a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury." 466 U.S. at 696. The United States Supreme Court in

Strickland carefully analyzed the prejudice required in order to support a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel as follows:
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An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment. Cf United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct.
665, 667- 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in
order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.

***

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test, cf United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 866-867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), and not
every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the
reliability of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a
showing that the errors "impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for
Respondent 58. That standard, however, provides no workable principle.
Since any error, if it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the
defense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it provides no way of
deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the
outcome of the proceeding.
466 U.S. at 691-93 (emphasis added).
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in addressing the prejudice component
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim makes the following observation:
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding
an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or
ev~n to address beth components of the inquir1 if the defendant n1akes a11
insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered
by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.
Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as
a result.
r

466 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added).
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In the present case, Davidson alleges both trial counsel gave legally incorrect
information and failed to file a motion to dismiss based on the same arguments he has made
on appeal. 7 However, where in cases like this, where the asserted deficiency on the part of
counsel consists of a failure to pursue a particular issue, which even if pursued would not have
afforded a basis for relief, the Court dismisses any ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 13 P.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (Ct. App. 2000); Huck v. State, 124

Idaho 155, 158-59, 857 P.2d 634, 637-38 (Ct. App. 1993). As the Court's ruling above
indicates, any pursuit of a Motion to Dismiss on the bases asserted by Davidson on appeal
would not have afforded a basis for relief, and, therefore, neither counsel's representation fell
below an objectively reasonable standard.

The Court affirms the trial court's decision

dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Davidson fails to establish reversible error in any of the five
issues he states on appeal. Therefore, the decision of the lower court is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 1st day of October 2010.

District Judge

7

Davidson also apparently claims that his second attorney was ineffective for failing to call hin1 to tell him about
a hearing. However, blame must ultinlately fa]] upon Davidson to go to an appointment that he admittedly
forgot. That claim is frivolous.
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